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Abstract
This paper takes a mathematical analysis technique derived from the Interroga-
tor’s Fallacy (in a legal context), expands upon it to identify a set of three inter-
related probabilistic tools with wide applicability, and demonstrates their ability
to assess hypothesis-evidence relationships associated with important problems.
1. Introduction
During the past 50 years, it has been well documented that humans suf-
fer from a variety of cognitive biases. Kahneman and Tversky are generally
credited with early ground-breaking research in this area [11], resulting in
the award of a Nobel Prize in 2002. Although some of their conclusions
(e.g., concerning base-rate neglect) have not gone unchallenged [8], it is to-
day generally acknowledged that the human mind is susceptible to systematic
cognitive errors. In response, the study of methods to improve information
assessment and reasoning strategies has endeavored to mitigate these errors.
An area that has received particular attention involves the issue of overcon-
fidence in one’s beliefs. Among the strategies which have evolved to address
the problem of overconfidence is one referred to as consider-the-opposite [1,
page 146]. This paper investigates the situation in which an individual is
confronted with a solitary hypothesis (h) and wishes to evaluate the effect
that a piece of evidence (e) may have on the probability of h being viewed
as true, namely p(h|e).
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics Vol 6, No 2, July 2016
180 Simple Tools with Nontrivial Implications
This paper’s principal focus is on a set of simple tools with wide-ranging
application which can be used to evaluate such conditional statements. The
following sections will provide: (1) a brief discussion of the overconfidence
issue and the benefit of considering a conflicting hypothesis, (2) an overview
of the Interrogator’s Fallacy from which the probabilistic tools are derived,
(3) a generalization of the tools’ range of applicability, and (4) practical ex-
amples to demonstrate their usefulness. The reader will see, in the practical
application of these tools, that they can be collectively viewed as a concrete,
formula-based approach within the family of consider-the-opposite strategies.
Their advantage is that they are simple and explicit. Rather than a descrip-
tive, subjective process (e.g., consider-the-opposite, Inference to the Best
Explanation), these tools depend upon the use of a simple formula: a math-
ematical relation involving two conditional probability statements in which
either (1) the relation holds or (2) it does not. In the material that follows,
the tools will be shown to constitute an explicit, formula-based contribution
to improved information assessment and decision making.
This material involves two distinct but related background issues: (1)
purely formal results derived from mathematical probability as axiomatized
by Kolomorgorov [13] and (2) the interpretation of these results. Generally
speaking, there is agreement concerning the validity of the mathematical
derivation of probability formulas and relations. However, with regard to
interpretation of probabilities, opinions differ, and this paper will concentrate
on two: (1) the classical interpretation of probability as a ratio between
favorable-cases and all-possible-cases as standardized by Laplace [14] and
(2) probabilities as subjective degrees of belief, an approach stimulated by
the early work of Borel [2], Ramsey [17] and de Finetti [7]. It is well known
that a duality exists between (1) the laws of probability based on a set-
theoretic approach and (2) the calculus of belief as applied to sentences within
a language [10, pages 14–15].
2. The Importance of the Negation of a Hypothesis
People adhering to a hypothesis (or dearly held belief) seem often to be
guilty of overconfidence in the correctness of their beliefs. This is a topic that
continues to receive much attention, comprising, for example, all of Part III
(titled “Overconfidence”) in Kahneman’s recent book [12, pages 199–265]. It
has been suggested by researchers that at least one cause of this behavior is
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the failure to seriously consider and confront alternative hypotheses, espe-
cially alternative and conflicting hypotheses. For example, Robyn Dawes, in
his highly acclaimed book, provides an extended discussion of three histori-
cally significant examples [4, Chapter 11 titled “Giving Up,” pages 230-253]
in which people maintained (i.e., failed to “give up”) unwarranted beliefs
held over long periods of time while failing to attend to substantial, well
publicized, disconfirming evidence. The three examples involve: (1) a fail-
ure of military intelligence, (2) use of the Rorschach inkblot test and (3)
graphology (handwriting analysis). In the process of evaluating what went
wrong in each of the situations, Dawes notes that an important and com-
mon characteristic within this group of examples is the lack of an alternative
hypothesis. He concludes that what is needed to combat such lapses in the
rational evaluation of beliefs is something to contrast with the dearly held
belief: a conflicting hypothesis. Fortunately, if one is working with a hy-
pothesis, h, then an immediately available conflicting hypothesis is simply
its negation, ¬h. The tools discussed below explicitly force one to confront
and evaluate ¬h.
3. The Interrogator’s Fallacy
This section initiates the discussion of what will ultimately be seen to
be a set of three related tools that may be productively applied to evaluate
a hypothesis-evidence relationship. Each of the tools forces a comparative
evaluation involving the negation of the original hypothesis. The discussion
starts with the introduction of a paper by Matthews called “The interroga-
tor’s fallacy” [15]. The analysis technique used by Matthews, in a legal
setting, will be used as a model to develop the above mentioned set of tools.
The reader will see that we are more interested in the analysis technique used
in [15] than we are in the fallacy itself.
The following discussion deals with the use of a confession in conjunction
with the evaluation of the guilt or innocence of an individual accused of a
crime. In times past, it is to be noted that many cultures and civilizations
have viewed the confession as a powerful piece of evidence, even to the point
of requiring no corroborating evidence [15, page 3]. Over time this attitude
has softened. For example, extracting a confession under duress is now inad-
missible. But it is nevertheless true that the legal system of today remains
generally convinced of the value of confessional evidence [15, page 3]. Con-
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fessions continue to play a role in a significant number of legal cases. So
now following the Matthewsf paper and its Bayesian approach, consider the
situation in which a crime has been committed, evidence has been gathered
by the police prior to any interrogation, and a person is accused of the crime.
Let p(G) be the prior probability of the guilt of the accused based on the
evidence gathered, where G is the event that the person is guilty. Suppose
that, subsequently, the accused person confesses to the crime. Let p(G|C)
be the posterior probability of guilt, where C is the event that the person
has confessed. Now, if the confession is to increase the probability of the
person’s guilt, then it must be true that
p(G|C) > p(G). (3.1)
However, using straightforward manipulations of simple conditional prob-
abilities, Matthews proves the following: If one wishes to assert that p(G|C) >
p(G), then it necessarily follows that
p(C|¬G) < p(C|G). (3.2)
In other words, it is a necessary consequence of Equation (3.1) that it
must be more probable that a guilty person will confess than that a not-
guilty, ¬G (innocent), person will confess, all under the same conditions. The
mere existence of a confession does not automatically guarantee increased
probability of guilt.
The Interrogator’s Fallacy sheds light on why, and under what circum-
stances, a confession may constitute evidence of questionable value. Before
continuing with our generalization of the above inequalities, let me stop for
a moment to explain why. Briefly, psychological research has identified cer-
tain personality traits (e.g., interrogative suggestibility and compliance) which
affect how individuals behave during a police interrogation. Simply put, in-
dividuals who are highly suggestive and compliant may exhibit, among other
things, a lack of assertiveness and a tendency to show obedience to author-
ity [15, page 4]. Matthews provides a more detailed explanation of situations
(especially involving cases of terrorism) in which the inequality of (3.2) above
is actually reversed. Matthews notes that the final effect is that the confession
by an innocent party may (surprisingly) constitute a disconfirming piece of
evidence which reduces the probably of guilt, and he names the phenomenon
the Interrogator’s Fallacy.
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Note well: Use of the tools described in this paper may depend on the
ability of a person to perform relative probability assessments. Ask people
to estimate the numerical probabilities (on a ratio scale) of both an automo-
bile accident, p(auto accident) and an airplane accident, p(airplane accident),
and they will invariably give answers which are not only incorrect, but
also highly variable. However, ask people to judge the relative magnitudes
of the two probabilities (on an ordinal scale) and most will answer that
p(auto accident) > p(airplane accident). They would be correct. In fact,
many people will go even further and state that the probability of an auto
accident is much greater than an airplane accident. Generally, people’s an-
swers to relative-magnitude questions will be more accurate than numerical
probability estimates.
In this paper, the importance of the Interrogator’s Fallacy is related only
little to its legal implications. The justice system of today generally recog-
nizes the possibility that a confession may be unreliable and that additional
evidence should be required in order to prosecute. Happily, the work by
Matthews provides scientific support for this recognition since it offers a
formal, mathematical justification for the skepticism. However, of equal im-
portance is the recognition that what Matthews did, analytically in a legal
setting, can be used in other application domains to provide insight by re-
structuring problems. In addition, the Matthews result generalizes directly
to a set of three simple formulas (the “tool set”) with widespread applica-
tion. The next section is concerned with generalizing the applicable range of
Matthews’ result.
4. Expanding the Useful Range of Matthews’ Result
It turns out that the necessary condition (3.2) given above by Matthews
is also sufficient. This means that (3.1) is logically equivalent to (3.2). As
such, the legal result by Matthews represents an instantiation of the first
item in the following set of three historically standard definitions of Bayesian
hypothesis confirmation pertaining to (1) confirming evidence, (2) discon-
firming evidence and (3) neutral (independent) evidence [10, page 92]. For
ease of reference, the three definitions are stated below (LHS) together with
their derived equivalencies (RHS).
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• Confirming evidence:
p(h|e) > p(h) iff p(e|¬h) < p(e|h) (4.1)
• Disconfirming evidence:
p(h|e) < p(h) iff p(e|¬h) > p(e|h) (4.2)
• Neutral evidence:
p(h|e) = p(h) iff p(e|¬h) = p(e|h) (4.3)
The following provides a brief proof of (4.1) as an indication of how the other
two equivalent formulations are derived:
(Necessary) First note that it is possible to represent p(h|e) in the following
manner [10, page 21]:
p(h|e) = p(h)/[p(h) + [p(e|¬h)/p(e|h)]p(¬h)].
To insure that the conditional probabilities are well-defined, assume that
each of p(e), p(h) and p(¬h) is non-zero. The inequality p(h|e) > p(h) in (4.1)
is then equal to the following inequality
p(h)/[p(h) + [p(e|¬h)/p(e|h)]p(¬h)] > p(h).
Solving for the quantity [p(e|¬h)/p(e|h)] gives
1 > [p(e|¬h)/p(e|h)],
which implies
p(e|h) > p(e|¬h).
(Sufficient) Starting with the necessary condition, it is a simple matter to
reverse the above steps.
I wish to emphasize three important points:
1. The domain of application for these three equivalency formulations is
wide indeed. In theory, they can be applied to test any hypothesis-
evidence relationship whose equivalent formulation is well defined. How-
ever, there is even more to say regarding this claimed domain of ap-
plicability. In some cases, the tools can be applied to a problem not
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obviously presented in the form of a solitary hypothesis-evidence re-
lationship (see Section 5.3). It may be possible to take the problem
and recast it in the form of a hypothesis. Next it may be possible to
identify a piece of evidence and then use the formulas to evaluate the
manufactured hypothesis-evidence relationship. The point to be em-
phasized is that the tools may be even more widely applicable than
initially appreciated.
2. As mentioned above, the Matthews result reminds us of a time-honored
conceptual approach for reasoning about a problem: it reframes the
problem. That is, it takes an initial problem such as (3.1) above, and
transforms it into an apparently different problem, such as (3.2) above,
while introducing the additional component ¬h. The original problem
is transformed into a new and different view of what turns out to be
logically equivalent to the original. As is well known, viewing things
from a different perspective frequently produces insight. For example,
in Matthews’ legal example, many (most?) people would be prepared
to accept the truth of (3.1) without reservation, until they are exposed
to the necessary consequence (3.2). This may lead them to reason more
deeply (thoughtfully) and recognize the possibility that the inequality
in (3.2) may not hold in all cases. The three formulas given above may
be viewed as concrete, Bayesian, reason-guiding tools.
3. Finally, as will be demonstrated below, there is value to be gained by
forcing an explicit consideration of ¬h into the discussion. Simply mak-
ing the effort to logically negate a statement-of-hypothesis may create
important insight (see Section 5.1). Furthermore, attending to ¬h is
not only useful but actually mandatory. If one accepts the definitions
of Bayesian hypothesis confirmation, then the equivalencies to the right
of iff would seem to require an analysis involving ¬h. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, it will be shown below that researchers and decision makers often
ignore ¬h, as well as the need to gather the information (evidence) re-
quired for its valuation. It will become clear that ignoring ¬h can lead
to very bad consequences.
5. Examples and Applications
In the discussion that follows, I refer to the above three formulas as
the “tool set.” By that I mean not only the three definitions of Bayesian
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confirmation together with their corresponding equivalent formulations, but
also the closely related admonition (i.e., operational philosophy) to consider-
the-opposite: ¬h. The importance of the tool set will be demonstrated by its
ability to guide the analysis/solution of a variety of difficult and important
problems. The solution process may not always be the most direct and will
sometimes border on the inelegant. However, the tools do seem to constitute
a comprehensive, single-source capable of guiding the reasoning process in
solving problems that have confused and even baﬄed people over the years.
The tools may be simple, but they work.
5.1. The Wason four card problem
The four card problem is easy to state and yet difficult for most people
to solve [19, pages 273–281]. Conceptually, it may be viewed as a psychology
experiment involving a participant seated at a table on which four cards
have been placed. The four cards are showing A, B, 2 and 3 respectively.
The participant is told that each of the cards has a letter on one side and
a number on the other side. The experiment coordinator then makes the
following assertion: “All cards with a vowel on one side have an even number
on the other side of the card.” The participant is asked which cards should
be turned over in order to test the validity of the assertion.
Over the past 45 years, this experiment (and variations on it) has been
repeated thousands of times, both (1) formally, in rigorously conducted ex-
periments to investigate the dynamics of why people answer the way they
do, and (2) informally with groups of students in psychology, logic, and crit-
ical thinking classes. The results are consistent over time. In the version of
the experiment described above, the great majority of participants (approxi-
mately 80%–90%) do not arrive at the correct solution. For example, Dawes,
himself a mathematical psychologist, informally administered the problem to
five colleagues who were also highly regarded (unnamed) PhD mathematical
psychologists. Only one of the five solved the problem correctly [3, page 126].
While a great deal of research and commentary has been generated in a
search for an answer to the question of why so many people do not arrive at
the correct solution, I have a different goal in this section. I choose not to
become embroiled in the discussion of “why?”, but will instead concentrate on
one particular method (among several possible) to solve the problem correctly
utilizing the operational philosophy of the tool set; we will consider–the–
opposite by explicitly negating the statement of hypothesis.
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The assertion by the experiment coordinator can be recast as an if-then
hypothesis statement h: “If a card has a vowel on the letter-side (p), then the
card has an even number on the number-side (q)” which is merely p→ q, and
which is equivalent to ¬p ∨ q. We next form the negation of the hypothesis
to see what it may reveal: ¬h = p ∧ ¬q. This negated hypothesis is easily
translated back into English as: “vowel on letter-side of card and odd number
on number-side of card.” Given the choices available among the four cards,
the answer suddenly becomes clear without any further effort; turn over the
cards marked with a vowel (A) and an odd number (3). Merely translating
h into ¬h provides the insight necessary to solve the problem. The solution
is simple, but it eludes most of the people who attempt the problem.
5.2. The NASA space shuttle Challenger disaster
This example involves the United States space agency (NASA) and the
space shuttle Challenger disaster of 1986. Following a high-level summary
discussion by Dawes, recall NASA’s worry involving the possibility of mal-
functions associated with O-rings during cold temperature operations [6,
pages 8–9]. In preparation for the launch, concern over the issue of low
air temperatures led to a request for engineers to graph the temperatures at
launch time for previous flights in which O-ring problems had occurred. Two
figures are shown below; Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 [6, page 9].
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Figure 5.1: O-ring performance against temperature for problem launches
Figure 5.1 plots temperatures vs. frequency of incidents (black dots)
for launches in which problems had occurred. This is the graph that was
requested.
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Figure 5.2: O-ring performance against temperature for problem and no-problem
launches
Figure 5.2 also plots temperatures vs. incident frequency, but includes
the additional launches in which no problems occurred. This is the graph
that was not requested. Figure 5.1 shows only problem launches, while Fig-
ure 5.2 shows all launches. When viewing data in Figure 5.1 for the 10 of
the previous 24 launches in which incidents were recorded, there does not
appear to be any particular relationship. A person looking at this plot might
easily believe that frequency of incidents does not depend on temperature.
However, when the 14 of the previous 24 launches in which there were no
incidents are included (Figure 5.2), there is a powerful incentive to believe
that a relationship between incidents and temperature does truly exist. In
spite of the small sample size, incident-free launches seem much more likely
to take place above 65 ◦F.
Imagine what might have happened if an analysis of the situation had
taken place using one of the tools in Section 4. Someone looking only at
Figure 5.1 (which is the only plot that had been requested and created)
and speculating that incident frequency is independent of temperature might
proceed as follows. Let the set of launches be viewed as composed of two
subsets: (1) launches with a non-zero incident frequency and (2) launches
with a zero incident frequency. If one sets I to be the event that the launch
has an incident, and T to be the event that the launch temperature ranges
from 50 ◦F to 80 ◦F in (4.3) above, then under the belief that the frequency
of incidents does not appear to be dependent on temperature, one might
believe that
p(I|T ) = p(I). (5.1)
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If this equality is believed to be true, then its equivalent formulation using
(4.3) above must also be true:
p(T |¬I) = p(T |I). (5.2)
Given that the graph in Figure 5.2 had not already been created, the need
to verify the equality in (5.2) would have led to the gathering/plotting of the
necessary data (i.e., noting the temperatures for launches with zero incident
frequency). Plotting the data for Figure 5.2 would have cast serious doubt
on the truth of (5.2). The distribution of temperatures in the absence of
incidents ¬I is substantially different from the distribution of temperatures
in the presence of incidents I. If (5.2) does not hold, it follows that (5.1) does
not hold. Incidents of O-ring problems at launch time are not independent
of temperature. The use of a tool that sensitizes one to adopt a consider-
the-opposite attitude and, further, encourages one to challenge an analysis
that does not reflect insight into “what is the situation when incidents do
not occur?” might have had a significant impact on the decision to launch.
A disaster might have been averted. Note that the air temperature at the
time of launch was 36 ◦F.
Dawes describes an analysis which fails to compare problem launches with
problem-free launches as irrational [6, pages 8–11]. He then goes on to label
a conclusion based on such a flawed analysis as pseudodiagnostic. Other
examples of pseudodiagnosticity identified by Dawes involve:
1. Investigations of problems in the United States at nuclear power plants
in which great effort is made to find the cause of the particular problem
in question (h), without making the comparison to other situations and
behaviors in which no problem occurred (¬h).
2. Failure in the U.S. to investigate safe airplane landings (¬h) and com-
pare them to a landing when an airplane crashes (h). For example,
the great emphasis placed on a detailed analysis of the crashed air-
craft’s cockpit flight recorder (“black box”) does not provide any such
comparison.
3. The tragic episode in the U.S. of Kip Kingel who killed his parents with
a gun and went on a high school shooting spree in Springfield, Oregon
in 1998. In the aftermath, analysis concentrated on Kip himself and
his family life (h), while ignoring any in-depth comparison of Kip to
high school, adolescent peers who did not engage in violent behavior
(¬h).
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There is more. The work of Russo and Schoemaker documents situations
in which “people often ignore important feedback about their failures because
feedback about successful decisions seems somehow more relevant” [18, pages
204–205]. Consider for example:
1. The product manager at a major U.S. consumer goods company who
admitted that “Of the new products we decide to field test, only the
successes are evaluated. We don’t have time to determine why the
other product ideas failed” [18, page 204]. Therefore, failures were not
compared to successes.
2. A nonprofit U.S. social service agency, which, when trying to charac-
terize what constituted a successful grant application, realized that the
applications concerning unsuccessful grants (90% of the proposals writ-
ten) had been destroyed. Only files for the winning applications had
been retained. No comparison was possible.
3. A large U.S. bank, which, when it decided to study why so many of
its loans to small/medium companies had “gone bad,” restricted its
analysis to the bad loans and failed to contrast them with the good
loans.
The conclusion is clear. It is not uncommon for investigators of important
problems to fail to explicitly address ¬h in a meaningful way. This failure
will lead to a flawed or incomplete analysis of the situation. Furthermore,
at the end of the analytical process, it is likely that any “answer” obtained
is actually an answer to the wrong question. Tools utilizing easily applied
formulas, which are reason-guiding and encourage investigators to consider
the negations of their hypotheses, will help to improve the quality of decisions.
5.3. A questionable claim regarding child sexual abusers
The purpose of this example is to demonstrate how the tools may be
used to examine a claim made in the U.S. by some licensed PhD clinical
psychologists regarding the treatment of child sexual abusers (pedophiles).
The questionable claim is this: “If there is one thing we know about child
abusers, it’s that they never stop on their own without therapy” [5, page
126]. This quote is reported by Dawes who was himself once preparing to
become a clinical psychologist but subsequently withdrew in his second year
of clinical training to pursue research as a mathematical psychologist. Similar
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quotes are found in [4, page 4] and [9, pages 3–4]. The tool set can be used
to demonstrate that, with high probability, clinical psychologists who make
the above assertion possess merely a belief; a belief which is neither justified
nor true.
To render the claim susceptible to analysis using the tool set, I rephrase
it in the following form: “If a person has previously committed child sexual
abuse, then the person will not stop unless the person undergoes psycholog-
ical therapy.” This may be more compactly stated as: “If the abuser does
not receive therapy, then the abuser does not stop.” But this statement is
logically equivalent to: “If the abuser does stop, then the abuser has received
therapy.” So, if the abuser has stopped because of therapy, it is certainly
the case that the probability of stopping is increased by the application of
psychological therapy. This final reformulation implies the following proba-
bilistic statement:
p(stop|therapy) > p(stop). (5.3)
Therefore, the original claim implies that therapy increases the proba-
bility of stopping. We now test (5.3) using (4.1) from the test set. The
reframed, equivalent formulation is:
p(therapy|¬stop) < p(therapy|stop). (5.4)
The strategy here is to identify abusers drawn from the populations as-
sociated with LHS and RHS and use them to create a contradiction to the
inequality in (5.4). This contradiction is then used to work backward, up the
chain of inferences, to show that the original claim is most probably false.
Consider the set of abusers in the LHS of (5.4) that do not stop abusing
(¬stop). With regard to these abusers, the probability of entering therapy to
mitigate abusive behavior, given that they do not stop, is probably large. The
longer abusive behavior goes on (i.e., does not stop), the greater is the chance
of these individuals being found out (e.g., caught in the act, accused/exposed
by a growing number of abuse victims), arrested and finally forced into ther-
apy as part of a criminal sentence or court-mandated condition of parole.
The probability of entering into therapy is large.
Consider the set of abusers in the RHS of (5.4) that do actually stop abu-
sive behavior (stop) without therapy. But how can an abuser stop without
therapy? Is it possible? By what mechanism could it be possible? Fortu-
nately, this reformulation of the problem at least forces one to begin to think
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about the issue. One of the possibilities that comes to mind is that, perhaps,
some of the abusers have simply summoned the courage and personal disci-
pline to quit on their own: they may have self-quit. I claim that this set of
former abusers is non-empty with non-zero probability. If any reader is skep-
tical of the ability of a child abuser to stop without therapy (e.g., self-quit),
consider the following observation. Some people do actually self-quit very se-
rious addictions (e.g., smoking, over eating/obesity, drugs, alcoholism, etc.).
Specific statistics are not so readily available, but we all know that it certainly
does happen. Given this insight, it is reasonable to believe that some child
sex abusers might also self-quit. Thus, the probability of some abusers stop-
ping (self-quitting) is not zero which means that the conditional probability
on the RHS of (5.4) is well-defined. We next examine the magnitude of the
RHS of (5.4). Note that the probability of entering abuse-mitigation ther-
apy given that these persons have stopped without therapy (e.g., self-quit)
is probably small. After all, the persons in question have actually stopped
the abusive behavior. Entering child-sexual-abuse-therapy voluntarily would
involve admitting a history of child sexual abuse, an admission that most
people would be hesitant to make, either because of personal embarrassment
or for fear of being reported to the legal authorities. The probability of
voluntarily entering into therapy is small.
If the reader finds the above discussion unconvincing, then consider the
following minimalist example. First, select one particular individual from the
population associated with LHS who is a habitual abuser (labeled HA) over a
long period of time and who does not stop (¬stop) the behavior. Next, select
one particular individual from RHS, who abused a child one time (labeled
OT), was greatly disgusted/upset by the incident, did truly stop and never
abused again (stop). Now compare the relative probabilities of each receiving
therapy. Clearly, it is likely that the habitual abuser (HA) will enter therapy
and more likely that the one-time abuser (OT) will not enter therapy.
The contradiction now follows. Since it is almost certain that LHS is rel-
atively larger than RHS (most certainly true for the single pair of individuals
OT and HA), the inequality in (5.4) almost surely does not hold. Given this
analysis, it may now be concluded: the claim in the introductory paragraph
is very likely false. It is very likely true that these clinical psychologists
cannot know what they claim to know.
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6. The Monty Hall Problem
The problem is patterned after a popular TV game show in the United
States in which a contestant selects (but does not open) one of three closed
doors, behind one of which is concealed a valuable prize. One door conceals a
new automobile, while the other two doors each conceal a goat. Subsequently,
the game show’s host Monty Hall opens one of the two doors not selected to
reveal a goat and then offers the contestant a chance to switch (1) from the
door initially selected (but not yet opened) (2) to the other unopened door.
To elaborate on the detailed rules of the game, note the following. Monty
knows (but does not divulge) the uniformly at random placed location of
the car. If the contestant should initially happen to select the door with the
car behind it, then Monty has two doors from which to uniformly at random
choose when picking one to open. If the contestant should initially happen to
pick one of the doors with a goat behind it, then the car is behind one of the
other two doors and Monty is constrained to open the only remaining door
which has a goat behind it. Finally, Monty does not open the contestant’s
initially selected door. It remains closed for the duration of the discussion.
The question posed in the game is this: is it beneficial to accept Monty’s
offer to switch doors?
The Monty Hall Problem gained nationwide attention in the U.S. when it
was discussed in 1990, in a popular, nationally syndicated newspaper column
written by Marilyn vos Savant. For more details on this fascinating contro-
versy, see [16, pages 42–45]. In her column, vos Savant stated correctly that
the high-probability choice is to accept Monty Hall’s offer and switch doors.
The American reading public erupted in protest! The vast majority (92%)
of 10,000 letter-writing-readers (including approximately 1,000 letters from
PhD scientists and mathematicians, many writing on their university depart-
ment stationary) strongly disagreed. In point of fact, most of the readers were
wrong, and vos Savant was correct. Interestingly, the prominent mathemati-
cian Paul Erdo¨s also rejected vos Savant’s solution [16, page 45]. He later
changed his mind only after witnessing a computer simulation of the problem
in which the solution converged to vos Savant’s answer.
The purpose of this example is not to provide yet-one-more contribution
to the large volume of writing that has been previously directed at the Monty
Hall Problem. It is, rather, to demonstrate how the tool set provides guidance
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in the analysis/synthesis of a problem that confounded a great many people
(including many PhD scientists and a world-class mathematician). The tools
can be used to (1) ask whether or not the opening of a door has changed the
probability of the car being behind the door offered by Monty in trade for
the one originally selected, and, if so, (2) in which direction (up or down).
I will not attempt to step through all possible combinations of contestant
door choices, identity of the automobile-hiding-door, and choices of doors to
be opened by Monty Hall, etc. The logic of the demonstration for one particu-
lar sequence of events translates easily to the other combinations. Therefore,
without loss of generality, suppose that the doors are labeled A, B and C,
that (1) the contestant initially chooses door A, and that (2) subsequently
Monty opens door B or door C (call this MontyB and MontyC, respectively)
to reveal a goat. Let A, B and C denote respectively the events that the car
is behind door A, door B or door C. According to the ground rules, the initial
probabilities for the car’s location are p(A) = p(B) = p(C) = 1/3. Under the
conditions stated, there are four important conditional probabilities relating
to the location of the car and the door which Monty opens for the contestant.
They are:
p(MontyB|A) = p(MontyC|A) = 1/2, (6.1)
since if the car is behind door A, Monty chooses one of the other two doors
uniformly at random. Similarly, it is easily seen that
p(MontyB|B) = 0, (6.2)
and
p(MontyB|C) = 1. (6.3)
Again, assuming that the contestant has made an initial selection of door
A, I will now formulate and answer three questions using (4.1) and (4.3)
above.
Question 1. Does p(C) remain constant following the contestant’s initial
selection of door A and Monty’s opening of, say, door B? Using (4.3) above,
this is question is written as p(C|MontyB) = p(C)? It can be rewritten
equivalently as the following question,
p(MontyB|¬C) = p(MontyB|C)?
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The question is now seen to be, does the right hand side equal the left
hand side? Note p(MontyB|C) = 1: if the car is behind door C and the
player picks door A then Monty has no choice but to open door B. The
value of p(MontyB|¬C) is 1/4. Given the car is not behind door C it is
equally likely to be behind doors A and B. If it is behind door B (with
probability 1/2), then Monty does not open door B. If it is behind door A
(with probability 1/2) then Monty opens door B with probability 1/2, giving
a left hand side of (1/2)(1/2) = 1/4. Since the right hand side does not equal
the left hand side, equality does not hold and p(C|MontyB) does not remain
constant after Monty opens door B. Its value changes.
Question 2. Does p(C|MontyB) increase in value? Using (4.1) above, this
can be written as p(C|MontyB) > p(C)? The equivalently formulated ques-
tion becomes: is p(MontyB|¬C) < p(MontyB|C)? Using a calculation
analogous to Question 1, one computes that p(MontyB|¬C) = 1/4 while
p(MontyB|C) = 1, so the inequality holds. Following the opening of door B
by Monty, p(C|MontyB) does actually increase in value.
Question 3. Does p(A|MontyB) remain constant? That is, does the prob-
ability that the car is behind the originally selected door A remain constant
given that Monty opens door B? Analogously, using (4.3) above, one finds
that p(MontyB|¬A) = p(MontyB|A) = 1/2 and equality holds. The prob-
ability of the car being behind door A has not changed.
To summarize, originally p(C) = 1/3, but opening a door increased
its value to some unknown quantity. Originally, p(A) = 1/3 and open-
ing a door has not changed its value. Since p(C|MontyB) is the only re-
maining unknown, it can be concluded that the updated probabilities are
p(A|MontyB) = 1/3 and p(C|MontyB) = 2/3. The high probability choice
is to switch. This is the solution originally given by Marilyn vos Savant and
the demonstration is complete.
Note that an interesting consequence of the above question/answer pro-
cess is the realization that the tool set is capable of functioning as a prob-
ability calculation engine. Within a “small” finite system in which some
numerical probability values are known, the equivalent formulations on the
right sides of (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) may be helpful in calculating some un-
known probabilities.
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The process demonstrated here can also be adapted to two other famous
problems which are closely related to the Monty Hall Problem. They are the
(1) Three Prisoners Problem and (2) Bertrand’s Box Paradox.
7. Final Comments on the Utility of the Tool Set
It may be claimed by some readers that the usefulness of the tool set
championed in this paper is diminished by the prior existence of other tools,
techniques, and processes. For example, the process of Inference to the Best
Explanation (IBE) certainly urges one to consider alternative explanations
for the observed evidence. Similarly, consideration of ¬h in the form of a null
hypothesis in statistical hypothesis testing involving, say, Fisher’s famous
lady-tasting-tea thought experiment, has been routine since the mid 20th
century. Finally, one might implement a full, formal Bayesian analysis of
a hypothesis-evidence relationship (using the odds-ratio form) requiring the
estimation of prior numerical probabilities and likelihood ratios in order to
arrive at estimates of a posterior probability.
These and other approaches exist, but I think that they are comparatively
more elaborate or less straightforward and difficult to use when stood next to
the simple, reason-guiding tool set of Section 4. The beauty of the tools lies
in their ease-of-use. Rather than merely urging one to “consider alternative
explanations”, they offer an explicit formula which says “plug in the infor-
mation and try to assess the relative magnitudes of the resulting conditional
probabilities.” Remember, in the absence of concrete, numerical probabil-
ity information, use of the tools relies on comparative magnitude assessment
(using an ordinal scale) rather than the computation of explicit probabil-
ity values (on a ratio scale). In fact, the tool set requires no estimation of
prior or numerical probabilities of any kind. It merely requires that the user
input parameter information (e.g., “the person is guilty,” “the person has
confessed,” “the abuser does not stop,” etc.) and then let a formula produce
conditional probability statements. The tools do not merely suggest, in a
general and non-specific way, that one should “consider alternative explana-
tions”, but instead mandate that one should form ¬h and see what effect it
has on the comparative magnitudes of the resulting conditional probabilities.
The tools reframe a problem. They introduce a new and different view of
the problem which frequently produces insight.
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The technical preparation required to use the tools is not large. Of course,
one needs to understand the elements of probability theory and how to for-
mulate and read conditional probability statements. However, I believe that,
for example, typical university students can probably be “up and running”
with test problems and conjectures using the tool set while other students
are still struggling with the complexities of the word “statistical” involved
in statistical hypothesis testing. Both the (1) ease-of-use and (2) power of
the tools are perfectly mirrored in Matthews’ original legal example. Most
any person can probably understand (and, moreover, agree with) the unex-
pected legal conclusion, that a suspect from the not-guilty population might
be highly suggestive and compliant, and therefore might be more likely to
confess than a guilty suspect. Moreover, in the hands of subject matter ex-
perts in other fields of inquiry, use of the tools may prove even more powerful.
Such experts would possess an understanding of additional underlying issues
and their subtle relationships. This broader and deeper understanding might
result in surprising insight when the domain specialists are led to contrast
and compare the conditional probabilities created by use of the tools.
If readers are still unconvinced, then consider using the tool set as a
screening device. Use it for preliminary evaluation of hypothesis-evidence
relationships and then move on to more complex techniques depending on
the outcome.
8. Conclusion
Motivated by the reading of the paper by Matthews, this paper has inves-
tigated the situation in which an individual evaluates a solitary hypothesis-
evidence relationship. Further motivated by the reason-guiding analytical
process demonstrated in Matthews’ work, it has concentrated on a set of
three simple analytical tools which are straightforward consequences of the
historically standard definitions of Bayesian hypothesis confirmation. Simple
does not mean trivial. Each member of the tool set involves a binary relation
between two conditional probability statements, one of which always includes
¬h. The tool set is applicable to any candidate hypothesis-evidence relation-
ship in which the equivalently formulated conditional probabilities are not
ill-defined. This collection of candidate problems is large.
The tools are not difficult to apply. At this point in the paper, five major
examples have been presented to illustrate their useful (practical) application.
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They are the analysis and solution of the Monty Hall Problem, criticism of
a questionable claim involving child sexual abusers, analysis of the NASA
disaster, solving of Wason’s card problem, and the Interrogator’s Fallacy
itself. The demonstrated ability of the tools to conform to the natural process
of analysis and synthesis for these problems is sufficient to hypothesize their
practical utility for solving a wide range of other problems. Even in situations
where the tools may not lead to an explicit solution of a specific problem,
the effort to apply them may reframe an issue and produce insight. In either
case, they will have proven themselves to be of value. Their application
would appear to constitute a formula-based, solution-guiding contribution to
information assessment and problem solving which can help people to reason
more effectively.
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